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We are constantly receiving sensory input from our eyes, 
ears, and skin, yet only a small portion of this sensory in-
formation ever arrives in our conscious awareness. The 
question of what determines access to conscious aware-
ness has been the subject of research interest for more than 
a century yet remains one of the most controversial issues 
in psychology. This controversy has, in part, arisen be-
cause it is so difficult to disentangle awareness from other 
cognitive processes, making it very difficult to study in 
isolation. However, in recent times, a paradigm has been 
developed that appears to offer a new and effective way of 
studying visual awareness—principally, by investigating 
situations in which participants fail to become aware of 
sudden and obvious changes in the world.
Under normal circumstances changes to our environment 
are easy to spot (a bird flying from its perch, for example). 
However, under certain circumstances, even large changes 
can go unnoticed. Specifically, observers frequently fail to 
become aware of a change when this change occurs simul-
taneously with another perceptual event. These perceptual 
events can include an eye movement (saccade; Bridge-
man, Hendry, & Stark, 1975; McConkie & Zola, 1979), 
eye blinks (O’Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 2000), the 
occlusion of a visual display with a mask (Pashler, 1988; 
Phillips, 1974; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997), or even 
a sudden onset that attracts attention but does not occlude 
the location of the change (O’Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 
1999). This phenomenon of change blindness has generated 
considerable interest and has become the focus of much 
recent research, since it appears to offer researchers the op-
portunity to investigate the precise conditions required for 
visual events, such as changes, to enter awareness.
One specific claim that has emerged from the study of 
change blindness is that in order for a visual stimulus to 
enter into awareness, it must first be attended (e.g., Simons 
& Rensink, 2005). In other words, attention is a necessary 
precondition for visual awareness. This conclusion is based 
principally on the observation that changes to interesting 
items are more easily detected than changes to less inter-
esting items (Kelley, Chun, & Chua, 2003; Rensink et al., 
1997) and that cuing the location of a change by informing 
the observer of the location of the change improves change 
detection (Rensink et al., 1997). This bold conclusion is 
consistent with the idea that attention acts to select certain 
sensory information for higher processing while inhibiting 
the processing of irrelevant sensory information.
However, it is worth exercising some caution before 
concluding, on the basis of these studies, that attention is 
required for visual awareness. It is less than ideal to use ex-
plicit cues to manipulate attention in order to examine the 
link between attention and awareness. Explicit cues guide 
attention by making the observer aware of the importance 
of a specific part of the scene. It is, therefore, not entirely 
surprising that calling part of a scene into visual awareness 
also makes subsequent changes to that part of the scene 
more likely to enter into visual awareness. A more convinc-
ing way to examine the link between attention and aware-
ness is to use an implicit or exogenous attentional ma-
nipulation that provides no information about the relative 
importance of specific parts of a scene. A typical example 
of an exogenous manipulation of attention is the Posner 
cuing task. Here, the sudden onset of a peripheral stimulus 
(cue) triggers a reflexive shift of attention to the location 
of the cue, producing faster and more efficient processing 
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studied and has a well-established time course. Finally, the 
task requires that fixation be maintained in the center of 
the display and that eye movements be forbidden, so that 
they cannot be confounded with covert attention.
A clear prediction can be drawn from the biphasic effects 
observed in the Posner (Posner & Cohen, 1984) paradigm. 
If attention is necessary for awareness of change, change 
detection should be easier at the location of a peripheral 
precue, but only during the 150 msec when attention is re-
flexively deployed to the cued location. At longer latencies, 
when attention is withdrawn from the cued location, change 
detection should return to baseline levels (or potentially get 
worse, since inhibition of return effects bias attention away 
from the cued location). Two experiments were conducted 
to test this prediction. Experiment 1 established the time 
course of attentional allocation in response to a peripheral 
precue. Experiment 2 then measured the impact of this at-
tentional shift on change detection. Eye movements were 
recorded in both experiments to ensure that the locus of 
attention was never confounded with gaze direction.
ExpERimEnT 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to establish the time 
course of the reflexive attentional shifts elicited during 
the sudden-onset paradigm. In order to make this task 
as similar as possible to the change blindness task, the 
display was occluded for 80 msec prior to target onset. 
It was predicted that the sudden onset would produce a 
short-lived perceptual facilitation at the cued location that 
should be observable at a cue–target stimulus onset asyn-
chrony (SOA) of 150 msec (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). At 
the longer 480-msec cue–target SOA, the facilitatory ef-
fect should be masked by inhibitory processes (Posner & 
Cohen, 1984). Note that the 480-msec SOA was the same 
as that employed by Scholl (2000).
method
participants. Six participants were recruited from the University 
of Durham (3 of them female). Their ages ranged from 23 to 42 years 
(mean age, 29 years). All the participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.
Apparatus. The stimuli were generated using a VSG 2/5 graph-
ics card (CRS, Rochester, England) and were displayed on a Sony 
Trinitron monitor with a 100-Hz refresh rate. Eye movements were 
recorded using a Cambridge Research Systems Video Eyetracker 
Toolbox (2.1) sampling at 50 Hz. Participant responses were re-
corded using a standard keyboard.
Stimuli. The array of objects consisted of a black fixation point 
and six white rectangular boxes (1.14º 3 0.57º) on a gray background. 
The boxes could appear at eccentricities of 11.4º, 8.5º, or 5.7º from 
fixation along the x-axis and 8.5º, 6.7º, or 4.8º along the y-axis (note 
that this means that no array item could appear within 5.7º of fixation). 
There were two constraints on the position of the boxes. First, there 
could be no two boxes at the same eccentricity on the x-axis. Second, 
there should be three boxes on the left and three boxes on the right of 
fixation. Boxes were randomly oriented horizontally or vertically. The 
probe stimulus consisted of a black asterisk (0.3º 3 0.2º).
procedure. The participants were presented with a display con-
sisting of a gray background with a black fixation point at the center. 
After 1,500 msec, five white rectangles appeared, followed 500 msec 
later by a sixth rectangle. After a variable latency (70 or 400 msec), 
of visual information at this location. These reflexive shifts 
of attention follow a well-established time course: The 
cue produces a short-lived facilitatory effect that peaks at 
~150 msec (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) and is superseded by 
a more sustained inhibitory effect after ~300 msec (e.g., 
Maylor & Hockey, 1985; Posner & Cohen, 1984).
Scholl (2000) employed just such a reflexive paradigm 
to study how change blindness is affected by attention and 
observed enhanced change detection at the location of a 
peripheral cue (which took the form of a sudden onset). 
Although Scholl’s data appear to support the notion that 
reflexive attention facilitates change detection, there is rea-
son to be cautious in drawing this conclusion. Specifically, 
Scholl reported a sustained facilitatory effect that was first 
observed 480 msec after the cue onset and persisted for 
several seconds. In other words, Scholl observed a facili-
tatory effect after reflexive attention had been withdrawn 
from the cued location. Thus, it is impossible to attribute 
the effects observed by Scholl to the facilitatory effects of 
a reflexive attention shift. In this context, it is important to 
note that Scholl did not record or control participants’ eye 
movements. It is, therefore, quite possible that the partici-
pants in his experiment moved their eyes to the location 
of the cue. A change presented at the location of the cue 
would then fall directly into their fovea. This could easily 
explain why change detection was significantly increased 
at the location of the cue and also why this effect lasted 
for several seconds. Given the well-established associa-
tion between eye movements and covert attention (e.g., 
Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 
1995; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986), the confound-
ing of eye position with locus of attention presents a major 
problem for the interpretation of effects, since it is im-
possible to rule out the possibility that the improved rates 
of change detection at the attended location are simply 
the consequence of improved vision at the center of vi-
sion. The failure to control for eye movements is further 
compounded by the use of very long presentation times 
that actually facilitate the use of overt searching strategies. 
For example, trials in Scholl’s experiment often lasted for 
several seconds. In this case, participants can easily move 
around their eyes. Moreover, unless the stimulus presenta-
tion is temporally constrained, it becomes impossible to 
compare the time course of change detection facilitation 
with the time course of attentional facilitation known from 
the Posner (Posner & Cohen, 1984) cuing task.
In order to address these issues and convincingly dem-
onstrate that attention per se is required to become aware 
of a change, it is necessary to employ a change blindness 
task that directs attention in a nonpredictive fashion, which 
is temporally constrained and dissociates covert attention 
from overt eye movements. One task that meets these re-
quirements is the Posner cuing task, in which a peripheral, 
nonpredictive spatial cue captures attention, leading to 
faster detection of subsequently presented targets (Pos-
ner & Cohen, 1984). This task is ideal, since the cue does 
not predict the location of the target and, therefore, does 
not manipulate expectancies in an implicit or endogenous 
fashion. Furthermore, the paradigm has been intensively 
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Reaction time. The participants’ mean RTs on the probe 
trials were subjected to a 2 (SOA: 150 or 480 msec) 3 2 
(validity: valid or invalid) repeated measures ANOVA. 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of validity 
[F(1,5) 5 7.75, p , .05] and a significant validity 3 SOA 
interaction [F(1,5) 5 8.14, p , .05]. Planned contrasts 
(paired sample t tests) revealed that interaction was driven 
by a significant cuing effect at the 150-msec latency, so 
that responses at the cued location were faster than those 
at the uncued location [406 vs. 434 msec; t(5) 5 2.89, p , 
.05]. This cuing effect was not present at the 480-msec 
SOA [411 vs. 408 msec; t(5) 5 0.943, p 5 .38]. Figure 2 
illustrates this interaction.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that per-
ceptual performance was facilitated at the location of 
the sudden onset, relative to the other locations, but 
only at short (150-msec) latencies. In contrast, there 
was no significant cuing effect at the longer 480-msec 
latency. These data demonstrate that the sudden onset 
produced a reflexive shift of attention but that the cuing 
effect caused by this attentional shift was not sustained. 
Since there was no baseline condition, it is impossible to 
determine whether the cuing effect reflects improved per-
formance at the cued location or inhibited performance 
at the uncued locations. Indeed, it is likely that the cuing 
effect was the product of some combination of these pro-
the display was occluded for 80 msec by a gray mask, after which 
the display of six rectangles reappeared. On 66% of the trials, a black 
asterisk appeared in one of the rectangles (probe trials); on the re-
maining 34% of the trials, no probe appeared (catch trials). On 16% 
of the probe trials, the asterisk appeared at the location of the sudden 
onset (valid trials). On the remaining 84% of the probe trials, the 
asterisk occurred at one of the uncued locations (invalid trials). This 
display remained present until the participants made a response. The 
participants were told to report whether or not they saw the probe by 
pressing the appropriate response key as quickly as possible. Each 
participant completed 10 practice trials and 320 experimental trials 
(80 catch trials, 40 valid trials, and 200 invalid trials). Figure 1 il-
lustrates the course of events on a typical trial.
Results
Data analysis. Responses were filtered to remove any 
trials on which the participants made a saccade before 
the onset of the mask and responses that were more than 
2.5 standard deviations longer than an individual’s mean 
reaction time (RT). Any eye movement with an amplitude 
of .2º was considered to be a saccade. These procedures 
resulted in the rejection of 2.6% of the trials (0.9% RT 
error, 1.7% saccades). For the analysis of RTs, the data 
were further filtered to remove incorrect responses, result-
ing in the rejection of a further 6.6% of the trials.
Accuracy. The participants mean accuracy scores were 
subjected to a 2 (SOA: 150 or 480 msec) 3 2 (validity: valid 
or invalid) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed 
no significant main effects and no significant interactions.
500 msec
70 or 400 msec
80 msec
Until Response
A
B
C
Figure 1. procedure during posner cuing paradigm (Experi-
ment 1). On all trials, we first presented an array of rectangular 
objects for 500 msec. Then a new rectangular object was pre-
sented for 70 or 400 msec (in this case, it is the new horizontally 
oriented rectangle in the lower left corner). Afterward, a blank 
mask was presented. The probe was presented during the final 
display, which lasted until the observer gave the response. These 
displays are illustrated in panels A–C for the different trial types. 
panel A shows invalid trials (target appeared at an uncued loca-
tion), panel B shows no-target trials, and panel C shows valid trials 
(target appeared at the cued location—i.e., in the new object in the 
lower left corner). The target remained visible until response.
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Figure 2. mean reaction times for correct responses during the 
posner cuing task (Experiment 1). Gray bars represent trials on 
which the cue and the target appeared at the same location (valid 
trials), and white bars represent trials on which the cue and the 
target appeared at different locations (invalid trials). Error bars 
show 61 SEM. There was a significant facilitation at the cued 
location for the 150-msec stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), but 
not for the 480-msec SOA.
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the cued location, but only for a short period of time. At 
longer latencies, the withdrawal of attention from the 
cued location should correspond with decreased ability 
to detect changes at that location.
method
participants and Apparatus. Experiment 2 employed the same 
participants and apparatus as those in Experiment 1.
Stimuli. Experiment 2 employed the same stimuli as those in 
Experiment 1.
procedure. Participants were presented with a display consist-
ing of a gray background with a black fixation point at the cen-
ter. After 1,500 msec, five white rectangles appeared, followed 
500 msec later by a sixth rectangle. After a variable latency (70 or 
400 msec), the display was occluded for 80 msec by a gray mask, 
after which the display of six rectangles reappeared. On 66% of the 
trials, a 90º rotation of one of the rectangles occurred (change tri-
als). On the remaining 34% of the trials, no rotation occurred (no-
change trials). On 16% of the change trials, the rotation occurred 
at the location of the sudden onset (valid trials). On the remaining 
84% of the change trials, the rotation occurred at one of the un-
cued locations (invalid trials). The participants were told to report 
whether or not they saw a change in the display by pressing the 
appropriate response key as quickly as possible. Each participant 
completed 10 practice trials and 360 experimental trials (i.e., in the 
change condition, there were 20 valid and 100 invalid trials at each 
SOA). Each participant also completed a block of 90 baseline trials 
on which all six rectangles appeared simultaneously (i.e., there was 
no sudden-onset precue). In this condition, changes occurred on 
66% of the trials. Half the participants received the experimental 
trials first; the other half received baseline trials first. Figure 3 il-
lustrates the course of events on a typical trial.
cesses. In contrast to the RT data, the peripheral cue had 
no effect on the participants’ ability to correctly detect the 
onset of the probe stimulus. This appears to have been due 
to a ceiling effect, since the participants correctly detected 
the probe on 91.25% of the valid trials and 93.8% of the 
invalid trials.
These data have two important implications. First, they 
confirm that the sudden onset reflexively attracts atten-
tion. Second, they confirm that the effects of this reflexive 
attentional shift do not persist until 480 msec after the cue 
onset. Experiment 1 has thus established the effect and 
time course of reflexive shifts in covert attention. If the 
reflexive attentional shift produced by the sudden onset 
also attenuates change blindness, we would predict that 
change blindness would be reduced at the cued location, 
but only at the first latency (i.e., 150 msec), and not at the 
longer latency (i.e., 480 msec).
ExpERimEnT 2
A second experiment was conducted to investigate 
the extent to which exogenously manipulating the locus 
of attention would affect participants’ susceptibility to 
change blindness. As with the previous experiment, a 
sudden onset was used to reflexively attract attention to 
one item in the array. If it is necessary to attend to an 
object in order to become aware of changes to that ob-
ject, we should observe facilitated change detection at 
500 msec
70 or 400 msec
80 msec
Until Response
A
B
C
Figure 3. procedure during the change blindness paradigm (Ex-
periment 2). The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1 
(see Figure 1). it differed only with respect to the final display. On 
the final display, no probe was presented, but one of the rectangles 
changed its orientation on some of the trials. The participants had 
to indicate whether a change had occurred or not. panel A shows 
trials on which change occurred at an uncued location (invalid 
trials), panel B shows no-change trials, and panel C shows trials 
on which the change occurred at the cued location (valid trials). 
The semicircular arrows illustrate the nature of the change and 
its location.
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Figure 4. Accuracy of change detection in Experiment 2. Dark 
gray bars represent trials on which the cue and the target ap-
peared at the same location (valid trials), white bars represent 
trials on which the cue and the target appeared at different loca-
tions (invalid trials), and light gray bars represent trials on which 
there was no sudden-onset precue (baseline trials). Error bars 
show 61 SEM. Change detection was significantly facilitated at 
the cued location during the 150-msec stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA), but not during the 480-msec SOA.
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sample t tests) revealed that RTs were significantly shorter 
for the valid than for the invalid trials at the 150-msec SOA 
[614 vs. 675 msec; t(5) 5 3.286, p , .05], but not at the 
480-msec SOA [618 vs. 644 msec; t(5) 5 0.699, p 5 .52]. 
Intriguingly, RTs during valid trials were not significantly 
shorter than those obtained during baseline trials [613 vs. 
603 msec; t(5) 5 0.22, p 5 .83]. Figure 5 illustrates these 
RT data.
Discussion
The sudden-onset cue had a striking effect on change 
detection. When the change occurred within 150 msec of 
the cue, detection was greatly facilitated at the cued loca-
tion. However, when the change occurred 480 msec after 
cue onset, there was no significant difference in detec-
tion accuracy between the cued and the uncued locations. 
Indeed, for the 480-msec SOA, detection was not signifi-
cantly different from that in the baseline no-cue condition. 
Valid cues also produced significantly shorter RTs for the 
150-msec SOA, but not for the 480-msec SOA. However, 
this effect is difficult to interpret, given the long overall 
RTs (around 650 msec) and the fact that this cuing effect 
appeared to be driven by a slowing of responses during 
invalid trials, rather than a facilitation of responses during 
valid trials, relative to baseline.
These results are consistent with the suggestion that at-
tention is a necessary precondition for a change to enter 
into awareness. The results are unlikely to have been the 
consequence of a voluntary shift of attention, since the 
benefits occurred too early and the cue itself provided no 
information about the location of the change. Furthermore, 
the possibility that performance reflected the foveation of 
the changing object can be excluded, since trials on which 
any saccade away from fixation was made were rejected.
GEnERAl DiSCuSSiOn
The goal of the present study was to establish that covert 
attention, rather than proximity to fixation, is required for 
an observer to become aware of a change. To do this, we 
first established the time course of reflexive attentional 
shifts in response to sudden onsets in a modified version 
of the Posner (Posner & Cohen, 1984) cuing paradigm. 
We observed cuing effects at short (150-msec) cue–target 
latencies that were not present at longer (480-msec) laten-
cies. On the basis of these results, it was predicted that 
a peripheral cue would also modulate change detection 
at short, but not long, latencies. Exactly this pattern of 
results was observed in our change blindness experiment. 
These data demonstrate that covert attention can facili-
tate change detection and are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that attention is a necessary precondition for visual 
awareness.
Intriguingly, on first inspection, our results appear to 
be contrary to those of Scholl (2000), who observed that 
sudden onsets produced a sustained facilitation of change 
detection despite the change’s occurring 480 msec after 
the onset of the new item (i.e., outside the time at which 
peripheral cues are known to facilitate target detection). 
Results
Data analysis. Responses were filtered to remove any 
trials on which the participants made a saccade before 
the onset of the mask and responses that were more than 
2.5 standard deviations longer than an individual’s mean RT. 
Any eye movement of an amplitude of .2º was considered 
to be a saccade. These procedures resulted in the rejection of 
3.1% of the trials (2.7% RT errors, 0.4% saccade errors).
Detection accuracy. The participants’ mean accuracy 
scores on the change trials were subjected to a 2 (SOA: 150 
or 480 msec) 3 3 (validity: valid, invalid, or no cue) repeated 
measures ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of validity [F(1,2) 5 5.825, p , .05] and a significant 
SOA 3 validity interaction [F(1,2) 5 9.608, p , .05]. An in-
spection of Figure 4 suggests that the interaction was driven 
by facilitation of discrimination accuracy at the cued loca-
tion during the 150-msec SOA that was not present during 
the 480-msec SOA. Analysis of simple main effects (paired 
sample t tests) confirms these impressions. Detection accu-
racy was significantly better on valid trials than on baseline 
trials [t(1,5) 5 4.985, p , .05] and invalid trials [t(1,5) 5 
5.584, p , .05]. Neither of these effects were observed for 
the 480-msec SOA [valid vs. invalid, t(5) 5 0.860, p 5 .429; 
valid vs. baseline, t(5) 5 0.502, p 5 .637].
Reaction time. The participants’ mean RTs on the change 
trials were subjected to a 2 (SOA: 150 or 480 msec) 3 
3 (validity: valid, invalid, or no cue) repeated measures 
ANOVA. This analysis revealed no significant main effects 
and no interactions. However, planned contrasts (paired 
700
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Figure 5. mean reaction times for correct responses during the 
change detection task (Experiment 2). Dark gray bars represent 
trials on which the cue and the target appeared at the same loca-
tion (valid trials), white bars represent trials on which the cue and 
the target appeared at different locations (invalid trials), and light 
gray bars represent trials that were not preceded by a cue (base-
line trials). Error bars show 61 SEM. There was a significant 
cuing effect at the 150-msec stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), 
but not at the 480-msec SOA.
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lem was avoided in our paradigm, since although we used 
a sudden onset to cue attention to a particular location of 
the visual scene, we then used a different change to probe 
for change awareness. This manipulation allowed us to 
dissociate the nature of the change from the attentional-
cuing effect that a sudden onset introduced and, more-
over, allowed us to study the temporal time course of such 
cuing effects on change detection.
It is of interest to note that although the precue caused 
a significant facilitation of both target detection (Posner 
paradigm; Experiment 1) and change detection (change 
blindness paradigm; Experiment 2) at the 150-msec la-
tency, there was no evidence of an inhibition of return ef-
fect at the 480-msec latency. A number of studies have 
shown that task difficulty can influence the time course 
of facilitatory/inhibitory effects induced by a peripheral 
precue (e.g., Klein, 2000). The effects of a peripheral pre-
cue are typically studied in displays with only two or three 
potential target locations that do not change from trial to 
trial. In contrast, the present experiment used displays of 
six items whose placement and orientation were random-
ized across different trials. Furthermore, in order to make 
this task as similar as possible to the change blindness 
task, the display was occluded for 80 msec prior to target 
onset. It may well be that these manipulations made the 
task sufficiently difficult to delay the onset of inhibitory 
processes until after the 480-msec SOA used in our task.
A second observation that warrants further comment 
was the high level of detection accuracy observed in the 
Posner cuing task (Experiment 1). The participants ac-
curately detected the appearance of the probe stimulus on 
more than 90% of the trials, despite the presence of a full-
field flicker that is known to interfere with the detection 
of changes in visual displays and that reduced accurate 
change detection to ~50% in Experiment 2. One possible 
explanation for this difference between probe and change 
detection is that the probe target was a sudden onset, and 
sudden onsets appear to be much less susceptible to change 
blindness than are other forms of change, such as the ori-
entation change used in Experiment 2 (Cole et al., 2003; 
Cole et al., 2004). Intriguingly, the validity of the precue 
did not have any effect on detection accuracy. This find-
ing appears to be in contrast with that of Tse et al. (2003), 
who reported that precues did facilitate color discrimina-
tions of sudden onsets. However, the similarity between 
the probe and the distractor stimuli in Tse et al.’s study 
was much greater than that in our paradigm (a 0.69º 3 
0.69º red or green onset among 149 similarly sized red 
and green placeholders, as opposed to a black asterisk in a 
white box). Furthermore, the participants in Tse et al. were 
asked to make a difficult color discrimination, whereas 
our participants had to perform a simple detection task. It 
seems plausible that differences in the relative difficulty 
of the discrimination tasks can account for the differing 
effects of the precue in the two studies.
In summary, none of the previously conducted studies 
provided clear evidence for a link between reflexive at-
tention and change detection. Our study is, therefore, in 
our view, the first one to demonstrate this link unequivo-
cally. Furthermore, our study also makes two additional 
In contrast, we observed that peripheral cues produced 
a short-lived facilitation of change detection 150 msec 
after cue onset that was no longer observable 480 msec 
after cue onset. However, the task utilized by Scholl dif-
fered substantially from our one-shot paradigm, in that 
eye movements were not constrained in his study and the 
change continued to be presented until it was detected. It is 
therefore probable that the sustained facilitation observed 
by Scholl was the product of either a voluntary attentional 
shift or an overt eye movement toward the cued location 
(indeed, Scholl notes this possibility in his article), rather 
than an effect of attentional capture.
A study by Tse, Sheinberg, and Logothetis (2003) in-
vestigated the effects of a peripheral cue on participants’ 
ability to report the color of a sudden onset that appeared 
simultaneously with a secondary visual transient. They 
reported that participants were more accurate at detecting 
the color of the sudden onset when it appeared both at 
the cued location and opposite to the cued location. Fixa-
tions were monitored during this task, so the improved 
color discrimination could not be attributed to an overt 
eye movement to the cued location. Crucially, however, 
Tse et al. presented the changed object on every trial. 
Thus, the participants were not required to report whether 
or not they perceived a change in the display but, rather, 
to guess the color of a new object. As Tse et al. noted, 
their data cannot distinguish conscious change detection 
(which requires awareness of the change) from successful 
color discrimination at the cued location (which does not 
require awareness of there having been a change) or some 
other, unconscious mechanism that might improve guess-
ing. The data in Tse et al. demonstrate that a large visual 
transient does not disrupt the allocation of reflexive atten-
tion, but they do not speak to the issue of whether or not an 
attentional shift is necessary for visual awareness.
Cole and colleagues (Cole, Kentridge, Gellatly, & 
Heywood, 2003; Cole, Kentridge, & Heywood, 2004) 
have previously demonstrated that sudden onsets are 
significantly more resistant to change blindness than are 
other types of change. However, it is important to note 
that Cole and colleagues were interested in using the 
change blindness paradigm to establish the special per-
ceptual status of novel objects, rather than to establish the 
role of attention in visual awareness. As a consequence, 
there are a number of reasons why the findings by Cole 
et al. cannot be used to test whether attention facilitates 
change awareness. First, the studies did not measure eye 
movements and, therefore, are subject to the same prob-
lem as the Scholl (2000) study. Second, Cole and col-
leagues suggested that it is the special perceptual status 
of a novel object that makes an object onset more immune 
to change blindness than is a change in the appearance 
of an already present object. Critically, the change to be 
detected, in this instance, was the onset of a novel object. 
As a consequence, the reduced change blindness could be 
a consequence of a reflexive attentional shift to an object 
that has newly appeared or could reflect the “special” sta-
tus of new object that are not subject to change blindness. 
The data of Cole and colleagues do not permit these two, 
equally likely possibilities to be dissociated. This prob-
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contributions. First, we established that the time course 
of attentional cuing in the change blindness paradigm is 
comparable to that in a Posner paradigm. This similarity 
suggests that the mechanisms underlying both attentional-
cuing effects are the same. If similar mechanisms mediate 
cuing effects in both the Posner paradigm and our change 
blindness paradigm, it seems reasonable to infer that the 
neural structures that have been demonstrated to facilitate 
discrimination at the cued location in a Posner paradigm 
are probably also critical for determining whether a change 
enters visual awareness or not. Second, although the Pos-
ner paradigm has proved to be one of the most popular and 
influential paradigms in the study of attention, the cuing 
effect can be small and unreliable. In contrast, the cuing 
effects obtained in our Experiment 2 are substantial and 
can be confidently demonstrated even in small samples. 
This paradigm therefore recommends itself as a more reli-
able tool for studying attention in humans.
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